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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STANLEY TITLE COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Plaintij f and Appellant, 
vs. 
THE CONTINENTAL BANK 
AND TRUST COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Case No. 
12271 
Stanley Title Company appeals from the order 
of the District Court dismissing its complaint. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court dismissed plaintiff's complaint 
with prejudice. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Stanley Title Company seeks to vacate the order 
of the lower court, and require it to deny the motion 
to dismiss, and order Continental Bank to answer or 
otherwise plead to the complaint. 
1 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case has been before this court twice be-
:f ore. The first time was when this appellant appeal-
ed from the judgment entered against it in favor of 
both Harlin Construction Company and this respon-
dent.1 This court upon hearing that appeal expressly 
affirmed both judgments of the lower court. This 
court concluded in that decision: 
"The findings and judgment of the trial 
court in favor of plaintiff Harlin Construc-
tion Company against Continental Bank and 
against George Stanley and Stanley Title Com-
pany are sustained; and the same order is 
made as to the findings and judgment in favor 
of Continental Bank on its cross-complaint 
against George Stanley and Stanley Title Com-
pany." 
W. P. Harlin Constriwtion Company vs. The Contin-
.ental Bank and Trust Company, et al., Case No. 
11504, 23 Utah 2d 422, 464 P.2d 585 (1970). 
On February 24, 1970, Continental satisfied 
,plaintiff's judgment against it and a Satisfaction of 
Judgment was filed. (case no. 12180, R. p. 655) Up-
on filing of the Satisfaction of Judgment and pur-
suant to the provisions of the original judgment, the 
District Court on February 26, 1970, entered judg-
•. lThe Notice of Appeal was filed by both The Stanley Title 
Company and George Stanley from both (a) judgment in favor .of 
plaintiff, and (b) judgment "in favor of the defendant The Contin-
ental Bank and Trust Company and against the defendants, Stanley 
Title Company and George Stanley." Harlin vs. Continental Bank, 
ct al.; this court's case no. 11504, R. p. 194. · 
2 
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ment against Stanley Title Company and George 
Stanley and in favor of Continental Bank (this 
court's case no. 12271, R. p. 11-12) and a copy of such 
judgment was mailed to counsel for Stanley Title 
Company and George Stanley. (case no. 12271, R. p. 
13) 
Subsequently, defendant George Stanley appeal-
ed from the judgment against him, alleging that the 
cross-judgment against him in favor of Continental 
was without jurisdiction, and asking that this court 
reverse its prior judgment against him and set aside 
the ruling of the Honorable Stewart Hanson affirm-
ing such judgment. On February 4, 1971, this court 
affirmed the judgment of the trial court and reaf-
firmed its former opinion. (Appellate case no. 12180) 
Now Stanley Title Company, which had been 
incorporated under the laws of the State of Utah, 
brings another appeal flowing from this original 
judgment. This appeal arises from an independent 
action to set aside a judgment, which was served· 
upon Continental on July 2, 1970. The complaint of 
Stanley Title Company alleges that the prior judg-
ment is "void for want of due process of law under 
the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the State 
of Utah." (Complaint, paragrah 6, case no. 12271, 
R. p. 2) Stanley Title Company appended certain 
of the pleadings from the original action as well as a 
portion of the transcript of counsel's agreement as-
exhibits to its complaint. 
3 
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Continental filed a motion to dismiss which 
stated: 
'''Defendant moves to dismiss plaintiff's 
complaint: 
1. For failure to state a claim against this 
defendant upon which relief may be grant-
ed. 
2. Plaintiff corporation was a Utah corpora-
tion. Its franchise was suspended in 1967 
for failure to pay taxes, and it has failed 
to file an annual report since 1968. 
Pursuant to § 59-13-61 UCA 1953 upon 
non-payment of taxes by a Utah corporation, 
all of its corporate powers, rights and privi-
leges are suspended and such plaintiff is bar-
red from bringing this action. 
Dated this 10th day of July, 1970." (Case 
no. 12271, R. p. 15) 
, Continental's motion was heard before the Hon-
orable James S. Sawaya on August 14, 1970. Contin-
~ntal contended in argument that there were no dis-
puted facts, and that this case should be decided as a 
matter of law. Continental presented a certificate of 
the Secretary of State which showed that effective 
September 30, 1967, Stanley Title Company was sus-
pended by the State Tax Commission of the State of 
Utah pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-13-61 ( 1953), and that the last annual report 
of such corporation required by Utah Code Ann.§ 16-
10-121 ( 1953) was filed by plaintiff with the Secre-
tary of State on March 6, 1968. (A photocopy of the 
4 
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Secretary of State's certificate is set forth in the ap-
pendix.) These facts were not disputed by appellant 
at the time of argument of the motion, appellant 
ra:ther arguing at that time that as a matter of law 
this did not prohibit plaintiff from bringing this ac-
tion, because such action was part of the winding up 
of the corporation. 
Continental argued that the case should be dis-
missed for two reasons: 1. Plaintiff had no capacity 
to bring this action; 2. The matter had already been 
determined. These two issues were argued. Counsel 
for plaintiff Stanley Title Company had present in 
court the official file in the original case. 
On September 1, 1970, the lower court executed 
the following order: 
1
'
1'Defendant's Motion to Dismiss coming 
on for hearing before The Honorable Jam es 
Sawaya on Friday, August 14, 1970; plaintiff 
being represented by George Stanley, Esq., 
and defendant by Albert J. Colton of Fabian 
& Clendenin, and argument being heard, and 
the court having considered the pleadings, the 
entire file in W. P. Harlin Construction Com-
pany vs. The Continental Bank and Trust 
Company, et al., Civil No. 269179, in the DJs-
trict Court of Salt Lake County, and the stip-
ulated fact that the records of the Secretary of 
State of Utah show that effective September 
30, 1967, plaintiff was suspended by the State 
Tax Commission of the State of Utah pursu-
ant to the provisions of Sect'ion 59-13-61 U~­
C.A. 1953, and that the last annual report re-
5 
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quired by Section 16-10-121 U.C.A. 1953 was 
filed by plaintiff with the Secretary of State 
on March 6, 1968, and the court, therefore, 
pursuant to Rule 12(c), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, having treated defendant's motion 
as. one. for _summary judgment, and no facts 
being in dispute, and good cause appearing 
therefor; 
It is hereby ORDERED: 
The plaintiff's complaint be and hereby 
is dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this 1st day of September, 1970." 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RULE 12(c) WAS PROPERLY INVOKED AND 
APPLIED, AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS 
RIGHTFULLY GRANTED. 
There is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
in this action which is in dispute. The facts are those 
contained in the official file of the original case and 
the official records in the office of the Secretary of 
.State. 
If this case were to be sent back for trial on the 
merits, the trial court would have nothing more be-
fore it than what was before the lower court at the 
time of Continental's motion. 
The sole. questions which have to be decided are 
questions of law, viz. ( 1) whether plaintiff's com-
plaint, in light of the facts set forth in the official file 
6 
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of the original case state a claim upon which relief 
may be granted; (2) whether suspension of the cor-
poration pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-61 
( 1953) and failure to file annual reports required 
by Utah Code Ann.§ 16-10-121 (1953) since March 
6, 1968 would bar a plaintiff from commencement on 
July 2, 1970 of an action to set aside the prior judg-
ment. Contrary to appellant's assertion, both of these 
issues were clearly raised in Continental's motion. 
Rule 56 (b) provides: 
''(b) For Defending Party. A party 
against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross~ 
claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is 
sought, may, at any time, move with or with-
out supporting affidavits for a summary judg-
ment in his favor as to all or any part thereof." 
The purpose of the rule is to obtain quick and 
inexpensive dispostion of cases where no facts are in 
dispute. Such relief was granted. If the lower court 
was in error in applying the law to these facts, this 
court may at this time so state. However, respondent 
urges that there are two separate and distinct legal 
bases for upholding the dismissal, each fatal to this 
appeal. 
POINT II 
THIS MATTER HAS ALREADY BEEN ADJU-
DICATED. 
Co-defendant George Stanley in a separate ap-
peal (this court's case no. 12180) contended that the 
judgment against him was without justification be.. 
7 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
cause in the initial pleadings in the case he was not 
specifically named as a defendant to Continental's 
cross-claim. Continental in that appeal argued that 
such contention is without merit as George Stanley 
consented to the court's jurisdiction and determina-
tion of this matter, inter alia, by appealing to this 
court from such judgment on its merits, and that the 
issue was argued in briefs, and this court affirmed 
such judgment. 
However, this co-defendant, Stanley Title Com-
. pany, does not even have this slender reed to lean up-
on. The cross-claim of Continental specifically names 
Stanley Title Company as a cross-defendant (case 
no. 12271, R. p. 7) and an answer to the cross-claim 
was filed by Stanley Title Company (case no. 12271, 
R. p. 10). 
At the end of the trial the court made findings 
of fact and conclusions of law and judgment was en-
tered providing for judgment 
'' (a) in favor of plaintiff Harlin against 
Continental, Stanley Title and George Stanley, 
jointly and severally; and (b) upon payment 
of this judgment by Continental Bank and 
Trust Company to plaintiff, Continental Bank 
and Trust Company do have and recover from 
Stanley Title Company and George Stanley, 
jointly and severally, the sum of $10,503.-
60 ... " (case no. 11504, R. p. 189) 
This judgment was affirmed on appeal by this court. 
Respondent has difficulty in following appel-
lant's argument on this point. It appears that appel-
8 
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lant contends that such judgment is unconstitutional 
under the due process clause because "The cross-
claim is contingent on the outcome of the original ac-
tion and does not state an existing cause of action." 
(Appellant's brief, case no. 12271, p. 13) 
But such argument flies directly in the face of 
Rule 13 ( f) which provides: 
"(f) Cross-Claim Against Co-Party. A 
pleading may state as a cross-claim any claim 
by one party against a co-party arising out of 
the transaction or occurrence that is the sub-
ject-matter either of the original action or of 
a counterclaim therein or relating to any prop-
erty that is the subject-matter of the original 
action. Such cross-claim may include a claim 
that the party against whom it is assert€d is 
or may be liable to the cross-claimant for all 
or part of a claim asserted in the action against 
the cross-claimant." 
The allegation of Continental was that if it were 
found jointly liable with the other defendants, it 
nevertheless had a claim over against such defend-
ants if it had to satisfy the judgment itself. The cross-· 
claim was a request for a determination as to who 
was to be ultimately liable among the various co-
def endan ts. 
The argument that Continental '·'dismissed and 
abandoned" its cross-claim is wholly without merit, 
as an examination of the entire transcript of argu-
ment and the specific argument of this point in Con-
tinental's appellate brief and the judgment of this 
9 
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court shows. It is wholly without merit even from 
the quotation from argument which appellant uses. 
Respondent is further puzzled by appellant's 
contention that no findings and conclusions were 
filed by Continental, but rather the conclusions were 
those '''of Harlin Construction Company." Respon-
dent had always assumed, and still believes this to 
be the law, that the findings and conclusions formally 
entered are those of the court, not of any party. The 
findings, conclusions and judgment adjudicated the 
rights and duties among all of the parties in this ac-
tion. 
But it is unnecessary to rebut appellant's con-
tentions in any detail. The simple facts of the record 
are enough. Continental filed a timely and proper 
cross-claim against this appellant, which this appel-
lant answered. Judgment on the cross-claim was en-
tered in favor of Continental and against appellant. 
This appellant appealed from that judgment on its 
merits, and this court expressly affirmed the judg-
ment. The matter is res judicata. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF HAS NO STANDING TO SUE 
Appellant brought this as a separate action in 
equity to set aside a judgment. Respondent contends 
that suspension of appellant by the State of Utah on 
September 30, 1967 pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
59-13-61 ( 1953) prohibits appellant from bringing 
such an action. 
10 
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Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-61 (1953) provides as 
follows: 
"Failure to pay tax - Suspension or for-
feiture of corporate rights. If a tax computed 
and levied hereunder is not paid before 5 o' -
clock p.m. on the last day of the eleventh month 
after the date of delinquency, the corporate 
powers, rights and privileges of the delinquent 
taxpayer, if it is a domestic corporation, shall 
be suspended, and if a :foreign corporation, it 
shall thereupon forfeit its rights to do intra-
state business in this state. 
"The tax commission shall transmit the 
name of each such corporation to the secretary 
of state, who shall immediately record the 
same in such manner that it may be available 
to the public. The suspension or forfeiture 
herein provided lf or shall become effective from 
the time such record is made, and the certifi-
cate of the secretary of state shall be prima-
facie evidence of such suspension or :forfeit-
ure." (emphasis added) 
Appellant seeks to avoid the sanction of this sta-
tute in several ways. Thus it argues that "from the 
face of the record the present action was commenced 
before the charter was suspended." (Appellant's 
brief, case no. 12271, p. 11) This is patently not so. 
This was a separate, independent action in equity by 
appellant's own admission. (Appellant's brief, case 
no. 12271, page 1) Appellant was suspended in Sep-
tember, 1967. This action was not commenced until 
July of 1970. 
Appellant does raise a more interesting argu-
11 
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ment in con'tending that the code provision relating 
to winding up after dissolution expressly gives the 
corporation the power to sue, quoting Utah Code Ann. 
§ 16-10-101 ( 1953). But merely to read that section 
is to disprove appellant's claim. The section provides: 
"Continuation of corporate existence to 
wind up after d'issolution. Nothwithstanding 
the dissolution of a corporation either ( 1) by 
the issuance of a certificate of dissolution by 
the secretary of state, or (2) by a decree of 
court, or ( 3) by expiration of its period of 
duration, the corporate existence of such cor-
poration shall nevertheless continue for the 
purpose of windin'g up its affairs in respect to 
any property and assets which have not been 
distributed or otherwise disposed of prior to 
such dissolution, and to effect such purpose 
such corporation may sell or other wise dispose 
of such property and assets, sue and be sued, 
contract, and exercise all other incidental and 
necessary powers.'' 
Appellant here is not claiming to be acting be-
cause of either ( 1) the issuance of a certificate of dis-
solution of the secretary of state, or (2) a decree of 
court, or ( 3) expiration of its period of duration. It 
is not alleged that the corporation is dissolved and is 
winding up. The facts are that it has been suspended, 
and while it is suspended its ''corporate powers, 
rights and privileges" are suspended. Indeed, any at-
tempt to ,exercise such rights, privileges or powers is 
made a misdemeanor. Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-62 
( 1953). I ts "powers, rights and privileges" of course 
would include the right to bring an independent ac-
12 
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tion in equity to set aside a judgment. Relief from 
such suspension may be obtained by proper applica-
tion and payment of twice the amount of tax and pen-
alties due, and thereupon the Secretary of State is 
authorized to issue a certificate of revivor. Utah Code 
Ann.§ 59-13-63 (Supp. 1969). But no claim is here 
made that this has been done. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 59-13-62 ( 1953) which makes 
exercise of the rights, privileges or powers of a cor-
poration which is suspended under Utah Code Ann.§ 
59-13-61 (1953) for failure to pay tax a misdemean-
or, evidences a legislative intent to deny all corporate 
activities, including access to courts, to the delinquent 
taxpayer. The legislative intent becomes even more 
clear upon consideration of Utah Code Ann.§ 59-13-
63 (Supp. 1969) which provides for revivor upon 
payment and states that: 
''The revivor shall be without prejudice 
to any action, defense or right which has ac-
crued by reason of the original suspension or 
forfeiture." 
Had the legislature not intended to deny the de-
linquent corporation access to the courts, this sen-
tence would have been unnecessary and certainly 
would not have been carried forward from the old 
statute into the 1969 amendment. Respondent sub-
mits that the three sections discussed above, when 
read together, reveal an effective and self-executing 
scheme of corporate tax collection. 
On the other hand, Utah Code Ann.§§ 16-10-100 
13 
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and 16-10-101 ( 1953) are designed to allow a dis-
solved corporation to wind up its affairs and dispose 
of its assets. This is necessary for the three specific 
situations provided for in those sections, but has no 
applicability to a corporation which is suspended for 
failure to pay taxes. Furthermore, such an expansive 
interpretation of winding up would weaken the ef-
fect of the suspension. In short, dissolution is clearly 
distinguishable from forfeiture and suspension. See 
Bland vs. Knox Concrete Products, 207 Tenn. 206, 
338 S.W. 2d 605. The distinction has been made by 
the legislature and should be followed by the court. 
Appellant has the legal means of curing this disabil-
ity. It has the means of obtaining the keys to the 
courthouse. But it must pay the State of Utah its 
proper taxes first. 
Appellant asserts that "[t]he closest case in 
point is that of Prudential Fed. S. & L. Ass'n. vs. 
Hartford Acc. & Ind. Co., 7 Utah 2d 366, 325 P.2d 
899." ('Appellant's brief, case no. 12271, p. 11) If 
the assertion is correct, there is no controlling case 
law on this issue. Prudential involved a foreign cor-
poration which had qualified to do business in Utah, 
but forfeited for failure to pay taxes during the pen-
dency of the litigation. To allow a suit to proceed 
under such circumstances serves the purpose of ju-
dicial efficiency. It does, however, weaken the effect 
of foref ei ture and suspension as a tax collection de-
vice. Thus, in cases which involve no competing inter-
est, such as judicial efficiency, Prudential should be 
held closely to its facts. 
14 
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It is unfortunate that appellant has not includ-
ed a transcript of the argument on the ruling of the 
lower court, as it is the clear recollection of counsel 
for the respondent that the issue as to plaintiff's sus-
pension was admitted at that time, and the argument 
was joined on the applicability of the "winding up" 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 16-18-101 ( 1953). 
Indeed, the lower court in its Order of Dismissal re-
fers to the entire file in the original case "and the 
stipulated fact that the records of the Secretary of 
State of Utah show that effective September 30, 
1967, plaintiff was suspended." (case no. 12271, R. 
p. 20) Inasmuch as the suspension is a matter of 
public record, it would be an unnecessary formality 
to require this case to be returned merely for the for-
mal insertion of this fact in the record. This court 
may take judicial notice of "public and private of-
ficial acts of the legislature, executive and judicial 
departments of this state ... " Utah Code Ann.§ 78-
25-1 (3), and it is hoped that this court would do so· 
in this instance, so that this issue may be decided on 
its merits. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent contends that this action is without 
merit. Its position is similar to that taken in Harlin 
vs. Continental (case no. 12180) and r e j e c t e d 
by this court, but here the case is even stronger 
for Continental, Stanley Title Company having been 
specifically named as a cross-defendant from the 
;15 
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time of the initial pleadings, and Stanley Title Com-
pany having no legal standing to commence an action. 
A determination and dismissal of the case by 
summary judgment is the proper and most expediti-
ous manner of dealing with the problem and tllis the 
lower court did. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
By ALBERT J. COLTON 
Attorneys for 
Defendant-Respondent 
800 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
16 
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I, CLYDE L. MILLER, SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT The Office of the Secretary of State made a record 
effective September 30, 1967 reflecting the suspension of STANLEY TITLE 
COMPANY, a domestic corporation of the State of Utah, by the State Tax 
Commission of the State of Utah pursuant to the provisions of Section 59-13-61. 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Replacement Volume 6. 
I further certify that the last Annual Report of the corporation 
required by Section 16-10-121, Utah Code Annotated 1953, Replacement Volume 2, 
was filed in this office on March 6, 1968. 
AS APPEARS ___ .>:0:..f...!R,,,e.,c"'o~rd,,,__ _ IN MY OFFICE. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF. I HAY• H•REUNTO err MY HAND 
AND AFl'IXED THE GREAT SEAL OF THE STAT• OF UTAH 
AT SALT LAKE CITY, THIS--...JNlll.:iL.InLttJlh ____ DAY OP 
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